Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 39
Issue 4 Summer 2008

Article 8

2008

A Lower Level of Scrutiny? New Alternatives for an
Effective Restraint on Competitive Activity
Daniel J. Raker
Argonne National Laboratory

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Raker, A Lower Level of Scrutiny? New Alternatives for an Effective Restraint on Competitive Activity, 39 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 751
(2008).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol39/iss4/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

A Lower Level of Scrutiny?
New Alternatives for an Effective Restraint on
Competitive Activity
DanielJ. Raker*
For decades, courts in Illinois and all over the country have struggled
with the enforcement of contractual terms that forbid an employee from
competing with a former employer. Courts must weigh an employer's
right to protect its interests against the employee's ability to earn a
livelihood. This analysis often leads to unpredictable results and makes
it difficult for employers to predict whether 1particular contractual
restrictions will be enforced by a reviewing court.
Despite this uncertainty, there are measures that employers can take
to make results more predictable. For example, several decisions have
embraced the idea of "forfeiture-for-competition" clauses that condition
an employee's receipt of certain benefits on that employee's promise
not to compete with the former employer. If the employee competes, he
or she will not be entitled to the benefit. Importantly, these forfeiturefor-competition clauses have been subjected to a lower level of scrutiny
than traditional non-competition clauses. Additionally, recent decisions
suggest that courts are more likely to enforce a restriction provision
where the company alleviates the effect of the former employee's "loss
of livelihood" by paying the former employee during the non-compete
period.
These developments suggest that courts may be willing to enforce an
arrangement that has developed in the United Kingdom, termed "garden
* Mr. Raker is an in-house attorney for Argonne National Laboratory specializing in labor and
employment issues. He would particularly like to thank Sean Nash of Winston & Strawn LLP for
his contributions to this article.
1. See Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain
Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2291 (2002)
("Restrictions such as non-competition and non-solicitation agreements have long been present in
many American employment contracts. Courts, however, have historically been skeptical of such
provisions and often refused to issue injunctions to enforce them. The resulting uncertainty has
proven to be a major problem for employers in many industries, who are left with no reliable
means of keeping their key employees from joining a competitor or competing themselves.").
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leave." Garden leave refers to a situation where an employee submits a
date certain for resignation in the future and thereafter receives a
paycheck while not performing any duties whatsoever for the employer.
The notice period under the contract essentially acts as the time period
that the employee's competitive activities will be restrained.
This Article reviews these legal alternatives and ultimately suggests
that arrangements requiring payment and retention of employee status
during a restricted time period may be subjected to a lower level of
scrutiny than traditional non-competition agreements. If this is true,
employers would be well-advised to enter into such arrangements with
important employees to ensure greater predictability of court review and
ultimately greater protection of their valuable business interests.

I.

TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS AS
"RESTRAINTS OF TRADE"

Under Illinois law, a restrictive covenant will be closely scrutinized
and only enforced if the party seeking to enforce the covenant can prove
that it has a protectable interest and that the terms of the restrictive
covenant are reasonable and necessary to protect that legitimate
interest. 2 This rule is well-established, but somewhat unpredictable. As
this Article's focus is not on the traditional non-compete analysis, this
section will merely summarize as background the standards typically
applied to non-competition agreements under Illinois law.
Because "[c]ovenants not to compete are, in effect, restraints on
trade," they are rigorously scrutinized by Illinois courts "to ensure that3
their intended effect is not the preclusion of competition per se."
Accordingly, in determining the enforceability of a covenant not to
compete, the "test applied by Illinois courts is whether the terms of the
agreement are reasonable and necessary to protect a legitimate business
interest of the employer." 4 A legitimate business interest exists in two
situations:
(1) where the customer relationships are near permanent and, but for
his association with the employer, the former employee would not
have had contact with the customers; and (2) where the former
employee acquired trade secrets or other confidential information
through his employment and subsequently tried to use it for his own
benefit.5

App. Ct. 1989).
2. Capsonic Group v. Swick, 537 N.E.2d 1378, 1382 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001).
3. Dam, Snell & Taveirne, Ltd. v. Verchota, 754 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Ill.
4. Id.

5. Id. at 469.
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Even where a legitimate interest exists, the restriction's
reasonableness still must be "measured by its hardship to the employee,
its effect upon the general public, and the reasonableness of the time,
6
territory, and activity restrictions."
This is a rather stringent standard and courts have repeatedly stated
that non-competition clauses are disfavored under Illinois law. 7 Illinois
courts will not enforce a non-competition clause merely because the
parties agreed to such an arrangement. 8
Using a complicated
framework with multiple factors to weigh, Illinois courts have arrived at
different results in seemingly similar cases. 9 As a result, the current
state of the law regarding non-competition agreements forces employers
to blindly place their faith in a reviewing court's hands to determine
whether the business interest is indeed "legitimate" and whether the
restrictions contained in the covenant are "reasonable." The level of
predictability presents a complicated quandary for employers who have
crafted post-employment restrictions to protect what they believe are
important business interests.
II. FORFEITURE-FOR-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS
Because of the high level of scrutiny courts give to post-employment
restrictions, employers have begun to seek alternatives to protect their
business interests with a greater level of certainty. One alternative
method some employers use to attempt to lower the level of scrutiny
applied to post-employment restrictions is to insert "forfeiture-forcompetition" provisions in stock incentives or other types of
compensation arrangements. 10
Essentially, under a forfeiture-forcompetition clause, a former employee receives some form of payment
(usually stock options or some other form of deferred compensation) in
exchange for the employee's agreement not to compete with the former
employer for a specified period of time. 11 If the former employee
wishes to compete with the former employer during the relevant time
6. Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Res. Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1997).
7. Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 607 F. Supp. 77, 79 (N.D. I11.
1985), aff'd and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 798 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1986).

8. Advent Elec., Inc. v. Buckman, 112 F.3d 267, 274 (7th Cir. 1997).
9. Compare Unisource Worldwide, Inc. v. Carrara, 244 F. Supp. 2d 977, 982 (C.D. II1. 2003)
(providing that a two-year restriction would be unreasonable), with Millard Maint. Serv. Co. v.
Bemero, 566 N.E.2d 379, 387-88 (I11.
App. Ct. 1990) (finding a two-year time restriction in a
non-competition covenant reasonable).
10. James V. Garvey & Frederic T. Knape, Employee Stock Forfeiture Provisions-A
Different Breed of Restrictive Covenant, 94 ILL. B.J. 376, 376-77 (2006).
11. Id.

754

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 39

period, the employer simply refuses to confer the deferred benefit on the
former employee-it is "forfeited" because of the former employee's
12
competition.
In Tatom v. Ameritech Corp., a leading case in the Seventh Circuit,
the court held that a "forfeiture-for-competition" agreement is subject to
less scrutiny than a traditional non-compete agreement.' 3
Tatom
involved a former executive of Ameritech who left the company to
work for a competitor. 14 The former executive, Tatom, had entered into
a forfeiture-for-competition agreement with Ameritech whereby he
forfeited his stock options if he competed with Ameritech. 15 Tatom
argued that the forfeiture clause was "an unreasonable, anti-competitive
16
restraint on his ability to obtain subsequent employment."'
In analyzing the forfeiture-for-competition clause at issue in Tatom,
the Seventh Circuit first noted that Illinois disfavors non-compete
provisions in employee contracts. 17 The court went on to reason:
This is not a case that involves a facially anti-competitive provision;
nothing in the agreements at issue actually restricted Tatom's ability to
work for Ameritech's competitors. Federal cases draw a distinction
between provisions that prevent an employee from working for a
competitor and those that call for a forfeiture of certain benefits should
he do so ....
An anti-competitive clause, if that is what the forfeiture provision here
is, may still be enforced in Illinois as long as it is reasonable. A
provision that calls for the forfeiture of a bonus in the form of stock
options does not strike us as an unreasonable restraint on
competition. 18
The Seventh Circuit in Tatom also found relevant that the
compensation at issue was stock options. 19 The court reasoned that
because stock options allow the employee to acquire an ownership
interest in the company, the options may legally be forfeited if the

12. Id. at 377; see also John Fellas, Garden Leave: A New Weapon Against a Departing
Employee, N.Y. L. J., May 29, 1997, at 34 (discussing New York cases "indicative of a judicial
willingness to enjoin an employee from working for a competitor when the former employer has
agreed to pay the employee for the period she is out of work").
13. Tatom v. Ameritech Corp., 305 F.3d 737, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2002).
14. Id. at 738.
15. Id. at 740.
16. Id. at 744.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 744-45 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 745.
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holder of the options goes to work for a competitor. 20 The Seventh
Circuit did not explicitly consider the impact of the forfeiture-forcompetition arrangement on Tatom's ability to make a living, but the
court noted that a forfeiture provision that directly affected a person's
livelihood would be more strictly scrutinized.2 1
Although Tatom is the Seventh Circuit's most recent pronouncement
on the subject of forfeiture-for-competition clauses, it is not the first.
The seminal Seventh Circuit case addressing such clauses is
Schlumberger Technology Co. v. Blaker.22 Schlumberger is important
because it delves deeply into the subject of forfeiture-for-competition
clauses and examines the policy rationales for enforcing them. 23 Judge
Easterbrook's insightful opinion endorsing forfeiture-for-compensation
clauses explains that the key to a successful provision is that it not
threaten an employee's economic livelihood:
Forfeiture contracts leave the ex-employee free to make a living as he
chooses. The former employee accepts the money (and refrains from
competition) only when the total income from the package plus noncompetitive employment exceeds the income he could earn from
competitive employment. Having such a choice does not threaten
states that
"loss of livelihood," so New York and the majority of other
24
have considered the question enforce these agreements.
A subsequent case in the Northern District of Illinois followed this
reasoning. In Spitz v. Berlin Industries, Inc., Judge Kocoras properly
observed that in Schlumberger, the Seventh Circuit simply applied an
economic analysis to determine whether the forfeiture-for-competition
clause should be enforceable. 25 Further, he noted that "forfeiture
provisions, unlike covenants not to compete, do not threaten one's
provisions need
ability to earn a livelihood. For that reason, forfeiture
26
compete."
to
not
covenants
like
not be analyzed
Schlumberger and Spitz provide clear precedent that the most
significant factor in favor of enforcing forfeiture-for-competition
clauses is that they do not threaten the affected employee's ability to
This rationale has been accepted in other
earn a livelihood.2 7

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
1994).
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 744-45.
Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Blaker, 859 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id.
Id.
Spitz v. Berlin Indus., Inc., No. 93 C 6355, 1994 WL 194051, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 13,
Id. (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Blaker, 859 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Spitz, 1994 WL 194051, at *3; Schlumberger, 859 F.2d at 516.
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jurisdictions as well.28 As will be discussed later, this economic
rationale for enforcement provides an excellent basis for applying a
29
similar analysis to slightly different restrictions on future employment.
The forfeiture-for-competition line of cases is extraordinarily
significant because it allows a post-employment restriction to escape the
higher level of scrutiny Illinois courts typically place on restrictive
covenants. This lower level of scrutiny allows employers to place broad
restrictions on post-employment activity that a reviewing court will only
refuse to uphold if the restriction is found "unreasonable."
Prior
precedent has somewhat eliminated a portion of the reasonableness
analysis, holding that such clauses generally do not have the same
hardship to the employee or effect on the general public as restrictive
covenants. This is a far cry from the exacting and unpredictable
standards found in Illinois precedent that require the covenant to be
reasonable and necessary to protect a legitimate business interest of the
employer.
Although Seventh Circuit precedent provides an excellent rationale
for subjecting a post-employment restriction to a lower level of scrutiny,
the forfeiture-for-competition clause still presents problems in terms of
employers' protection of interests.
First and foremost, under a
forfeiture-for-competition arrangement, the former employer cannot
30
obtain an injunction to prevent the former employee from competing.
By its very terms, the only remedy for the employer under the
forfeiture-for-competition clause is to stop any payment of the forfeited
sums. The former employee could, of course, retaliate by filing a
lawsuit challenging the forfeiture clause as unreasonable. This would
be the worst result for the employer-it leaves the employer (1) without
a contractual remedy against the former employee's competitive
conduct, and (2) facing a potentially expensive lawsuit defending the
legal validity of the forfeiture-for-competition clause. Therefore,
although an attractive option for employers, forfeiture-for-competition
clauses have serious drawbacks.
Wouldn't it be nice to have all of the benefits of a forfeiture-for-

28. See Everett v. Nefco Corp., No. 3:06-cv-00047(VLB), 2007 WL 2936210, at *2 (D.
Conn. Oct. 9, 2007) (quoting Spitz v. Berlin Indus., Inc., No. 93 C 6355, 1994 WL 194051, at *3
(N.D. 1Il. May 13, 1994)) (noting that forfeiture provisions are distinct from restrictive covenants
in that they do not inhibit a person's ability to earn a living).
29. See infra Part IV.C (examining how courts would interpret a garden leave arrangement).
30. Although the employer would be unable to seek an injunction pursuant to the forfeiturefor-competition clause, there may be other grounds for the employer to seek injunctive relief,
including a violation of a contractual confidentiality clause, violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets
Act, a breach of the duty of loyalty, or a tortious interference claim.
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competition clause without these potential drawbacks? The remainder
of this Article tackles this very question.

Il.

GARDEN LEAVE

A concept somewhat similar to forfeiture-for-competition clauses is
31
an arrangement commonly used in England called "garden leave."
Although garden leave is a well-established practice in the United
Kingdom, it is a concept that is relatively foreign to the U.S. courts.
Garden leave refers to the situation where an employee submits a
certain date for resignation in the future and, thereafter, receives a
paycheck while sitting at home tending to his "garden." 32 During this
period, the person remains an employee collecting a salary, but does not
perform any duties whatsoever for the employer.
Rather, the
employee's only duty during this time is to remain idle and not compete
with the employer. The employer's interests are protected in that the
employee is not competing, and the employee's interests are protected
in that he continues to earn a living by receiving a paycheck from his
33
employer.
Assuming a court would enforce a garden leave provision, the
advantages to an employer of using garden leave as a restriction on
future employment are enormous. For one, the employee remains
employed and, therefore, is subject to all of the duties that apply to a
current employee-i.e., the duty of loyalty.
Further, should an
employee attempt to join a competitor during the garden leave period,
the original employer will have many weapons to counter that activity,
including seeking an injunction to stop the competing employment.
This is different than a forfeiture-for-competition clause, which, as
discussed earlier, does not in and of itself permit an injunction as a
remedy. Under a forfeiture-for-competition clause, the employer
merely quits paying the benefit. Under a garden leave arrangement, the
employer can file a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief to stop the
competing activity. This is an extremely attractive option for employers
because it allows for greater protection of important business interests
and can halt the employee's competitive activities nearly instantaneously through a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.

31.

See Lembrich, supra note 1, at 2291 (describing England's solution to non-competition

agreements).
32. Id; see also Fellas, supra note 12, at I (explaining the concept of garden leave and the

reasons why it is standard in certain types of English contracts).
33.

Lembrich, supra note 1, at 2292.
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An excellent summary of garden leave and its development in
American courts can be found in Greg Lembrich's 2002 Note. 34 As
noted by Lembrich, garden leave is a concept that has not received a lot
of scholarly attention and has not yet been refined and developed by
American courts. 3 5 There are, however, several key cases applying the
general concept of garden leave and suggesting that it may be a viable
and enforceable alternative to traditional restrictive covenants under
certain circumstances. This Part briefly summarizes the development of
this doctrine on the American side of the pond and adds several more
recent cases to the developing case law.
Most of the cases addressing compensation arrangements with
restrictions similar to garden leave have occurred in New York. For
example, in Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage, Inc., a New York state
court upheld a six-month restriction in part because the affected
employees would continue to receive their salary during the six-month
period. 36 In finding this restriction reasonable, the court explicitly
noted that the payment of base salary "protects the employee's
livelihood. '37 Similarly, in Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, a federal court in
New York stated that "the crucial issue" in the case was how to interpret
"a special kind of restrictive covenant, one that compensates a former
38
employee who cannot work because of the terms of the agreement."
In granting the employer preliminary injunctive relief, the court relied in
part on Maltby, holding that the restriction was reasonable in light of the
fact that the employee would receive his salary "including payment of
39
premiums for health and life insurance" during the restricted period.
The concept of compensating an employee for a period of noncompetition was developed further by the Second Circuit, applying New
York law, in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Cohen.40 Ticor involved a
title insurance company seeking an injunction against a former title
insurance salesman who went to work for a competitor. 4 1 The salesman
had entered into an employment contract with Ticor that included a sixmonth non-competition provision following the termination of the

34. See id. (comparing restrictive covenants in the United States and garden leave policies in
the United Kingdom).
35. Id. at 2292-93.
36. Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage, Inc., 633 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
37. Id.
38. Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 629 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
39. Id. at 636.
40. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1999).
41. Id. at 66-67.
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salesman's employment. 42 The contract also included $600,000 in
annual compensation and an express provision that Ticor was only
entering into the agreement contingent on the salesman abiding by his
contractual post-employment restrictions. 43 The Second Circuit looked
to Maltby for guidance in analyzing the enforceability of this noncompetition provision and held as follows:
Appellant maintains that Maltby can be distinguished, because in that
case the employees were paid their base salary during the restricted
period, while [the salesman] will receive nothing during his six-month
hiatus. The significance of the salary paid in Maltby was that it helped
alleviate the policy concern that non-compete provisions prevent a
person from earning a livelihood. Here, by the same token, part of
[the salesman's] $600,000 per year salary was in exchange for his
promise not to compete for six months after termination, and since the
employer had given [the salesman] sufficient funds to sustain him for
six months, the public policy concern regarding impairment of earning
a livelihood was assuaged. 44
Ticor is a somewhat surprising decision in that it extends the logic of
Maltby to situations where certain money is paid in the form of salary
even before the employee manifests his desire to move to a competitor.
The Second Circuit's analysis was likely impacted somewhat by the
high salary the salesman received. Nonetheless, Ticor indicates that a
court will not be greatly concerned about an employee's ability to earn a
livelihood if the employer pays a significant amount of money related to
a post-employment restriction.
The most recent decision from the Southern District of New York
analyzing an arrangement similar to garden leave is Estee Lauder Cos.,
Inc. v. Batra.45 The defendant Batra, a senior executive for two of Estee
Lauder's brands, left to work for a competitor. 46 Batra, however, had
previously entered into a restrictive covenant with Estee Lauder that
restricted him from working with any of Estee Lauder's competitors for
47
a period of one year upon termination of his employment.
Additionally, Batra's employment agreement with Estee Lauder
provided that he would receive his full salary during the restricted
period.4 8 Estee Lauder sued Batra, seeking preliminary injunctive relief

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 71.
Estee Lauder Cos., Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 162.
Id.
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to enjoin Batra from violating the terms of the employment
49
agreement.
The court looked to the reasonableness of the restrictions found in the
employment agreement in analyzing whether preliminary injunctive
relief should have been granted. 50 In addition to looking at the
traditional factors of durational reasonableness and geographic scope,
the court reasoned:
An additional factor courts will look to in evaluating the
reasonableness of a restrictive covenant is whether an employee
receives continued consideration for his loyalty and good will ....
The desire to avoid "impairing the employee's ability to earn a living,"
is largely mitigated where an individual continues to receive a salary
51
in return for not competing.
Applying this rationale, the court went on to hold that although the
geographic scope of the restrictive covenant was "all-encompassing,"
the fact that Batra would receive his salary during the period of the
prohibition meant that his ability to earn a living would not be
jeopardized. 5 2 Despite finding the compensation element relevant, the
court declined to enter an injunction lasting for the contractual twelvemonth restriction. 53 The court held that a five-month period was
54
sufficient to protect Estee Lauder's trade secrets.
IV. APPLICATION OF FORFEITURE-FOR-COMPETITION JURISPRUDENCE TO
GARDEN LEAVE

As this Article has indicated, the forfeiture-for-competition line of
cases in fllinois opens the door for restrictions on employment that are
subject to a lower level of scrutiny than traditional non-competition
clauses. Furthermore, garden leave provisions may also be subjected to
this lower level of scrutiny.
As previously discussed, one of the biggest shortcomings of
forfeiture-for-competition clauses is that they do not allow the original
employer to seek an injunction prohibiting competition.
The
employer's only recourse with respect to a competing former employee
is to withhold a particular benefit. This is one of the most important
differences between a garden leave arrangement and a forfeiture-for-

49. Id. at 160.
50. Id. at 180.
51. Id. (internal citations omitted).
52. Id. at 181.

53. Id.
54.

Id. at 182.
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competition clause. The ability to pursue injunctions based on the
lower level of scrutiny applied in forfeiture-for-compensation cases
would be a powerful weapon for employers. The argument in favor of
allowing employers to use garden leave as a weapon is that, like
forfeiture-for-competition clauses, garden leave does not present a true
"restraint of trade." Thus, by definition, it has no impact on the
livelihood of the affected employee.
The questions, therefore, are what such an arrangement may look like
and how it would be interpreted under Illinois law. As of the writing of
this Article, the answers are not crystal clear, but current case law
provides some evidence that arrangements similar to garden leave may
be enforced by Illinois courts in the future.
A. The Baxter Problem
The first reported case applying Illinois law to a provision similar to
garden leave is relevant to an analysis of garden leave arrangements in
Illinois. 55 Although at first blush it may appear to present an obstacle to
the enforcement of such arrangements, a closer analysis reveals that this
is not the case. In Baxter International,Inc. v. Morris, a former Baxter
research scientist, Dr. Roger J. Morris, went to work for a Baxter
competitor in the area of developing, manufacturing, and selling
diagnostic equipment for use in microbiological laboratories. 56 In
connection with his employment at Baxter, Dr. Morris entered into a
covenant not to compete with Baxter for one year following the
termination of his employment. 57 The agreement apparently provided
that Dr. Morris would be compensated during the non-compete period.5 8
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the enforceability of the covenant under
Illinois law. 5 9 In its analysis, the Eighth Circuit deferred to the district
court's holding that Dr. Morris could work for the competitor without
divulging Baxter's trade secrets. 60 It also deferred to the district court's
decision that "even if [the competitor] paid Morris's salary for the year
he would be forbidden to work by the covenant, Morris would suffer

55. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1992).
56. Id. at 1192.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1197. In evaluating the reasonableness of the agreement's restrictions, the court
noted the district court's finding that Microscan paying Morris's salary was not sufficient to save
the agreement.
59. Id. The Eighth Circuit noted that the district court had improperly analyzed the restriction

under California law.
60.

Id. at 1197.
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61

undue hardship."
As the summary above demonstrates, the Eighth Circuit in Baxter did
little more than defer to the determinations of the district court. This
deference was odd given that the Eighth Circuit explicitly held that the
district court wrongfully applied California law to the contractual
provision. 6 2 The Eighth Circuit held that Illinois law applied because of
a forum selection clause in the agreement and because California did
not have a greater interest in the effect of the non-compete covenant
63
than Illinois.
The important issue now, therefore, is to determine Baxter's likely
impact on future decisions in Illinois and the Seventh Circuit. The
answer: very little. First, Baxter was an Eighth Circuit case applying
Illinois law that is binding on neither Illinois courts nor the Seventh
Circuit. Second, the Eighth Circuit devoted only one sentence to
64
analyzing the impact of compensation during the restricted period.
This surface analysis could hardly persuade future courts in light of the
strong precedent established by other cases outside of the jurisdiction.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Baxter decision is fifteen years
old. The development of case law in this area in the intervening fifteen
years suggests that compensation during a restricted period is a very
65
relevant consideration.
B. CurrentDevelopments
Despite the existence of Baxter, it remains unclear how a court in
Illinois would analyze a provision placing restrictions on employment
for a period during which the person remained a paid employee and was
forbidden from competing with the employer. Although no Illinois
decision has explicitly addressed this issue, a recent but little-noted
Northern District of Illinois case confronted a similar situation.
In Hearns v. Interstate Bank, the Northern District of Illinois upheld
a restriction with important similarities to garden leave. 66 The plaintiff,

61. Id.
62. Id. at 1196-97.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1197.
65. At least one other commentator agrees. See Lembrich, supra note 1, at 2319-20 ("The
courts that have dealt with this question, since, however, have refused to follow the Baxter court
and have found an employer's willingness to pay the employee during the restraint period

persuasive.").
66. Heams v. Interstate Bank, No. 05 C 175, 2006 WL 862893, at *1 (N.D. I11.Mar. 31,
2006).
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763

Hearns, was a director of the defendant Interstate Bank. 67 Hearns had
entered into a contract with Interstate Bank that provided that he would
receive a salary of $96,000 per year for ten years, provided that he
abided by certain restrictive covenants. 6 8 In addition to a three-year
restrictive covenant following the termination of Heams' employment,
the agreement provided:
[W]hile in the active employ of the Corporation, the Employee will
devote such time, skill, diligence and attention to the business of the
Corporation as required in order to carry out the duties and obligations
of the employee to the Corporation and will not actively engage, either
directly or indirectly, in any business or other activity which is or may
be deemed to be in any wai
competitive with or adverse to the best
6
interest of the Corporation.
Hearns became eligible for payments under the agreement in 2002.70
He continued to serve as the chairman of Interstate Bank's loan
committee, the examining audit committee and the assets and liability
committee. 7 1 Simultaneously, Hearns participated integrally in the
formation of a competing bank. 72 Upon learning this information,
Interstate Bank terminated him as a director and ceased making any
payments whatsoever under the contract. 7 3 Hearns sued Interstate Bank
alleging that this discontinuation of payments constituted a breach of
74
contract.
Judge Norgle of the Northern District of Illinois analyzed Hearns'
claim as a simple contract matter. 7 5 The court noted that it was
undisputed that Hearns, while serving as a director of Interstate Bank,
also served as an organizer for a competing bank.7 6 Therefore, if acting
as a director of Interstate Bank constituted Hearns' "employment" by
Interstate Bank, his activities with a competitor clearly breached the
contract. 77 In analyzing the meaning of "employee" in this context, the
court held that the contract unambiguously identified Heams as an
employee. 78 In fact, the contract explicitly stated that the term
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3-*5.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
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"employee" referred to Hearns. 79 In response to Hearns' argument that
he was not in fact an employee, the court stated, "regardless of what the
common law definition of the term 'employee' may or may not be, it is
abundantly clear that the parties have unambiguously provided,
throughout the entirety of the Contract, that Hearns was an employee of
'
[Interstate Bank]. 80
Therefore, the court held that Hearns violated the agreement and was
not entitled to the payments. 8 1 Summary judgment was entered in favor
of Interstate Bank. 82 Because the court found that Hearns violated his
duties to Interstate Bank as an employee under the agreement, the court
reasoned that it was unnecessary to analyze the post-employment
83
restrictive covenant found in the agreement.
There are several notable aspects to the Hearns decision. The most
important is that the court deferred to the definition of "employee"
found in the contract, rather than the common-law definition of the
term. This principle is very important for analyzing how a future
Illinois court may interpret a garden leave provision. Under a garden
leave arrangement, the employee would remain employed by the
company during a restricted period. The agreement setting forth that
arrangement would explicitly define the employment relationship to
include the notice provision and the idle time period of employment
during which competition would be forbidden. Under Hearns, as long
as the definition of employee and employment is set forth
unambiguously by the parties, it will be enforced. Presumably, a
definition of employment that includes a period of garden leave would
therefore be contractually enforceable-regardless of whether the
person on garden leave meets the common law definition of
"employee."
Although Hearns may mark the beginning of a new line of cases, it is
important to note that Hearns did not involve a claim for injunctive
relief or a notice provision of the sort that is typically found in garden
leave arrangements. Because there was no notice period at issue, it is
important not to read Hearns too broadly. Even so, future cases
examining garden leave provisions with a notice period may cite
Hearns for the proposition that such an arrangement should be subject
only to the ordinary contract analysis found in Hearns, and not the

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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greater level of scrutiny reserved for restrictive covenants.
C. Application to Future Cases
In order to analyze the potential impact of Hearns, the following
hypothetical is helpful. Assume an employee and employer enter into
an employment agreement with the following essential terms:
The employment relationship is at-will;
There is a six-month restriction on employment with a competitor;
The employee will continue to receive his full salary and health
benefits during the six-month period of the non-compete;
A six-month notification period is required in order for either party to
terminate the employment relationship;
The six-month non-compete period begins upon that notification by
either party; and
The employment relationship will be terminated upon the expiration
of the six months.
Assume further that the employee resigns and begins working
immediately with a competitor. The original employer files a lawsuit
seeking to enjoin the employee from violating the employee's
obligations under the agreement.
Based upon the decisions discussed in this Article, there is reason to
think that a court's analysis of whether to issue an injunction will not
subject the employment agreement to the rigorous scrutiny typically
applied to restrictive covenants. Like the forfeiture-for-competition
cases, enforcement of this contractual provision will not prevent the
employee from making a living. As discussed above, this rationale
helped justify the lower level of scrutiny in the forfeiture-forcompetition cases. Therefore, the lower level of scrutiny should also be
applied here.
Further, Hearns suggests that the type of employment arrangement
involved in the hypothetical posed above would not be invalidated
because of the definition of the employment relationship.
The
definition of "employment" is unambiguous in the contract; thus, there
would be no reason to strike it down based on a common law
interpretation of the employment relationship. In fact, as discussed
above, that argument was explicitly rejected in Hearns. Although an
Illinois court has not yet encountered this situation, there are good
arguments in favor of enforcing the terms of a non-compete provision
that provides for continuing employment and continued salary.
Although there are solid arguments supporting the enforceability of
garden leave, there are areas where the arrangement could be
challenged. For example, an employer seeking to enforce garden leave
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with an injunction will face the argument that the injunction is being
used as a sword to restrain the employee's mobility. The former
employee may also argue that an extended notice period somehow
changes the positions of the parties such that an at-will employment
relationship no longer exists. Another potential pitfall is an agreement
that describes the job duties of the employee but fails to note that those
duties may include a period of garden leave. 84 These scenarios are
beyond the scope of this Article, but they are potential pitfalls that
employers must address in carefully drafting these types of
arrangements.
CONCLUSION

Although the current state of the law in this area remains
underdeveloped, there are good reasons for employers to use a system
similar to garden leave to deal with key employees. Garden leave
arrangements are expensive in that they require ongoing payments
during the restricted period, but these payments dwarf the potential
amount the company would spend in ongoing litigation related to the
breach of a restricted covenant. Further, employees that continue to
receive their salaries will be less likely to compete, given that their
livelihood remains intact via the ongoing receipt of salary. Garden
leave may not be enforced by every court that reviews the arrangement
in the future, but it does provide a useful and powerful tool for
employers to use in their efforts to secure and keep safe their most
important business interests. Careful, forward thinking and drafting can
avoid many of the potential pitfalls and provide the best opportunity for
protection of employers against competing employees.

84. See Invesco Institutional, Inc. v. Johnson, 500 F. Supp. 2d 701, 712-13 (W.D. Ky. 2007)
(involving an employment agreement that provided specific duties for the employee that could
only be changed by mutual agreement, and the dispute that arose after the employer placed the
employee on administrative leave without consent in violation of the agreement).

